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Abstract
We describe a new classical bit commitment protocol based on cryptographic con-
straints imposed by special relativity. The protocol is unconditionally secure against clas-
sical or quantum attacks. It evades the no-go results of Mayers, Lo and Chau by requiring
from Alice a sequence of communications, including a post-revelation verification, each of
which is guaranteed to be independent of its predecessor.
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1. Introduction
The discovery of secure quantum key distribution[1] and other applications of quan-
tum information has excited much interest in the general question of precisely which cryp-
tographic tasks can be guaranteed secure by physical principles. In particular, several
papers[2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10] have addressed the question of whether security can be physi-
cally guaranteed for the key crytographic primitive of bit commitment.
In a bit commitment protocol Alice and Bob exchange data in such a way that Bob
obtains an encoding of a bit chosen by Alice. For the protocol to be secure against Bob,
it must guarantee that Bob cannot decode the bit until Alice chooses to reveal it by
supplying further information. For it to be secure against Alice, it must guarantee that
the bit is genuinely fixed between commitment and revelation: there must not be two
different decodings of the bit which leave Alice free to reveal either 0 or 1, as she wishes.
Bit commitment per se has obvious practical applications. For example, a secure bit
commitment protocol would allow Alice to make predictions which could be verified post
hoc without giving Bob any possibility of extracting information before the predicted event.
More generally, bit commitment is a powerful cryptographic primitive. A trusted protocol
for committing a classical bit could used as a building block for protocols implement-
ing a wide range of other cryptographic tasks, including coin tossing[11], zero-knowledge
proofs[12], oblivious transfer[13] and (hence) secure two-party computation[14].
In the standard cryptographic scenario, Alice and Bob each occupy a laboratory. Each
trusts the integrity of their own laboratory but nothing outside. It is usually implicitly
assumed that the presumed separation of the laboratories is large compared to their size.
In this situation, a protocol must allow for a time lapse between the transmission of a
signal and its receipt. However, neither party can be certain whether the other actually
it is confined to a distant laboratory: if it were advantageous, Bob might set up a secret
laboratory adjacent to Alice’s, or vice versa. Allowing for special relativity gives no se-
curity advantage under these conditions, since no time lapse can be guaranteed, so that
no arrangement of timings in a protocol can guarantee that messages sent by Alice and
by Bob were each generated without knowledge of the other. Thus they are effectively re-
stricted to protocols in which they sequentially exchange messages, each waiting to receive
one message before sending the next, and their communications may as well be taken to
be non-relativistic.
We refer to any bit commitment protocol that relies on this scenario as a standard
protocol. We refer to a protocol as classical if the protocol can be followed by exchanging
classical information, and as quantum if it requires the exchange of quantum information.
We follow the formal definitions of perfect and unconditional security given in Ref. [6].
All standard classical bit commitment protocols are in principle insecure, though very
good practical security can be attained. Several quantum bit commitment schemes have
been proposed.[e.g.2--5] But all standard quantum bit commitment schemes were also
shown by Mayers, Lo and Chau[6,7,15,8,9] to be insecure. We follow general usage in
referring to the result that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment is impossible
as the Mayers-Lo-Chau no-go theorem or MLC theorem.
In practice, current bit commitment protocols rely for their security on the assumption
that some computational task is sufficiently hard that it cannot be carried out during the
lifetime of the protocol. While those assumptions are generally well founded, they never
absolutely guarantee security. Moreover, the possible development of quantum computers
renders the computational assumptions underlying present day bit commitment protocols
distinctly vulnerable. The MLC theorem tells us that quantum technology offers no com-
pensating solution. Lo has also shown that other two-party cryptographic tasks cannot be
securely implemented by quantum communication.[16]
All of these no-go theorems implicitly assume that relativity can be neglected, as is
indeed the case for standard protocols. Here we describe a protocol which uses a vari-
ant of the standard cryptographic scenario in which each party controls two separated
sites. Relativity plays an essential role in this protocol: its security is guaranteed by the
impossibility of superluminal signalling.
Variations of the standard cryptographic scenario of this type, in which special rel-
ativity plays a roˆle, do not seem to have been widely considered. Such protocols were,
however, mentioned briefly in Mayers’ announcement of the no-go theorem[6] for uncon-
ditionally secure quantum bit commitment, where it is suggested that the no-go theorem
applies also to quantum bit commitment protocols based on special relativity.
The validity of the MLC theorem in the standard scenario is not disputed here, but
we argue for the opposite conclusion when special relativity is taken into account. We first
describe a relativistic cryptographic scenario in which each party controls laboratories in
two separated locations. These laboratories must be near to mutually agreed coordinates,
and the protocol includes tests to verify that this is so. This should be stressed: neither
party needs to trust the other’s word as to the locations of their laboratories, nor do these
locations need to be declared precisely.
Next, we describe a bit commitment protocol in this scenario. The protocol is classi-
cal: it does not require the transmission or processing of quantum information. Nothing
in it prevents either party from using quantum information transmissions. However, the
classicality of the information could be enforced by a reasonable extra cryptographic as-
sumption, namely the use of channels trusted by both parties to be decohering. Its security
can thus sensibly be analysed by considering it either as a classical protocol or a quantum
protocol. It is, we argue, unconditionally secure in either case.
Ben-Or et al. (BGKW) some time ago[17] proposed an interesting bit commitment
protocol which, like that presented here, depends on separating Alice into two parties,
in this case isolated by Faraday cages. Its security against quantum attacks has been
discussed by Brassard et al. (BCMS) [10]. Among the significant differences between the
Ben-Or et al. protocol and the one below are that the BGKW protocol gives Bob no
reliable test for ensuring that the two Alices are indeed unable to communicate: unlike the
present protocol, its security is not guaranteed by physical laws. If the isolation is ensured
by special relativity, the BGKW protocol can be seen as a precursor of that described here.
The possibility of ensuring temporary isolation by special relativity was noted by
BCMS [10].1 However, no complete discussion of the uses of relativity in obviating the
need for trust seems to have previously appeared in print. As the next section explains,
the protocol given here uses a relativistic scenario in which Alice and Bob are treated
symmetrically and in which it is demonstrably unnecessary for either party to trust in the
locations of the other. Finally, the key new feature of our protocol is the use of a sequence
of communications to maintain security indefinitely.
2. Cryptography and relativity
We now consider a cryptographic scenario in which two parties carry out operations
from separated regions in Minkowski spacetime. In fact, it is sufficient for the local ge-
ometry to be approximately Minkowski, so that the protocol can indeed be securely im-
plemented in the real world. However, strictly speaking, even assuming an approximately
Minkowski background violates the cryptographic rule that the world outside the labo-
ratory cannot be trusted. Alice and Bob need to be confident that the geometry of the
spacetime region is indeed nearly flat, that they have a correct description of the local light
1 BCMS follow Mayers in concluding that unconditionally secure bit commitment is impossible.
cones, and that there are no wormholes or other mechanisms allowing signalling between
spacelike separated points.
These caveats are rather irrelevant for practical applications at present. It seems safe,
for example, to neglect the danger that a protocol carried out within the solar system
might be subverted by one of the parties surreptitiously introducing very massive bodies.
Still, there is a theoretical case for distinguishing unconditional security based on special
relativity and on general relativity. We take special relativity to be the underlying theory
here, and we set c = 1.
Consider now the following arrangement. Alice and Bob agree on a frame, on global
coordinates, and on the location of two sites x1, x2. Alice and Bob are required to erect
laboratories, including sending and receiving stations, within a distance δ of the sites,
where ∆x = |x1−x2| ≫ δ. The precise locations of the laboratories need not be disclosed:
it is sufficient that test signals sent out from each of Bob’s laboratories receive a response
within time 2δ from Alice. In the protocol below, Bob need not reply immediately to Alice’s
communications, but the parties will probably want to test that Bob likewise replies to
Alice’s test signals within time 2δ in order to confirm that the channels are working properly
in both directions. The laboratories need not be restricted in size or shape, except that
they must not overlap. This is implied by the standard assumption that Alice and Bob
are each confident of the security of their own laboratories. We refer to the laboratories in
the vicinity of x
i
as Ai and Bi, for i = 1 or 2.
We assume that A1 and A2 are collaborating with complete mutual trust and with
prearranged agreements on how to proceed, to the extent that we identify them together
simply as Alice; similarly B1 and B2 are identified as Bob. For example, considering
embassies as faithful representatives of their respective governments, we could take A1 to
be the Andorran embassy in Belize, B1, and B2 the Belizean embassy in Andorra, A2.
3. A bit commitment protocol
We first define a classical protocol and then examine its security against quantum
attacks. Alice and Bob first agree a large number N . For simplicity we take N = 2m,
where the integer m is the security parameter for the protocol. All the arithmetic in
the protocol is carried out modulo N . Before the protocol begins, A1 and A2 agree a
list {m1, m2, . . .} of independently chosen random numbers in the range 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
The length of the list that will eventually be required is an exponential function of the
anticipated time between commitment and unveiling. Alice and Bob also fix a time interval,
∆t << ∆x, during which each round of communication between Ai and Bi (for i = 1 or
2) must be completed.
The protocol now proceeds as follows. Between time t = 0 and t = ∆t, B1 sends A1
a labelled pair (n10, n
1
1) of randomly chosen distinct numbers in the range 0, 1, . . . , N − 1.
On receiving these numbers, A1 returns either the number n
1
0+m1 or n
1
1+m1, depending
whether she wants to commit a 0 or a 1, quickly enough that her message ends by time
t = δ + 2∆t and so can be received by B1 before time 2δ + 2∆t. At time t = T =
∆x− 2∆t− 3δ, B2 asks A2 to commit to him the binary form a
1
m−1 . . . a
1
0 of m1. This is
achieved by sending A2 a set of m labelled pairs (n
2
0, n
2
1), . . . , (n
m+1
0 , n
m+1
1 ), and asking A2
to return n2
a1
0
+m2, . . . , n
m+1
a1
m−1
+mm+1. Bob’s message is to be completed by time T +∆t
and Alice’s by T + δ + 2∆t. Next, at time t = 2T , B1 asks A1 to commit the binary
forms of the random numbers m2, . . . , mm+1 used by A2. At time t = 3T , B2 asks A2 to
commit the binary forms of the random numbers mm+2, . . . , mm2+m+1 used by A1 in this
commitment; and so forth. These later exchanges are all similarly timed, so that Bob’s
(N + 1)-th communication is completed by NT +∆t and Alice’s by NT + 2δ + 2∆t. The
random pairs sent by the Bi are all drawn from independent uniform distributions.
These commitments continue at regular intervals separated by T , consuming increas-
ingly long segments of the random string shared by the Ai, until one or the other of the
Ai — or perhaps both, at spacelike separated points — chooses to unveil the originally
committed bit. It is assumed that the Ai have previously agreed under which conditions
either of them will unveil. For A1 to unveil, she reveals to B1 the set of random numbers
used by A2 in her last set of commitments; similarly, A2 unveils by revealing to B2 the
random numbers last used by A1. To check the unveiling, B1 and B2 send the unveiling
data and all previous commitments to some representative of Bob. This representative
need not be in the same location as one of the Bi: if he is, only the other Bi need send
data.
In any case, Bob cannot verify the unveiling at any point outside the intersection of
the future light cones of the points from which the Ai sent their last communications — i.e.
the unveiling and the last set of commitments. In this sense, the protocol is not complete
at the moment of unveiling: it becomes complete only when Bob has all the necessary
data in one place. The need to wait for receipt of information which is unknown to the
unveiler Ai (since it depends on the last set of pairs sent by B3−i) and to the unveilee Bi
(since it includes the last set of commitments sent by A3−i) means that the protocol is not
vulnerable to a generalised Mayers-Lo-Chau attack.
The protocol is clearly secure against Bob, who receives what are to him random
numbers throughout the protocol, until unveiling. We give here informal arguments for
the insecurity against Alice.
4. Security against classical attacks
Can Alice unveil a 0, having committed a 1, or vice versa? Note first that if A2 unveils
at times between 0 and T , the protocol is clearly secure. Now suppose for definiteness that
A1 unveils at time between NT and (N + 1)T . If the Ai have followed the protocol
throughout, and A1 now gives B1 the random numbers used by A2 in her last commitment
outside the future light cone of this communication, Bob will — once B1 and B2 have had
time to communicate — be able to decode successive commitments back through to obtain
the originally committed bit.
On the other hand, if A1 gives B1 any other set of random numbers, they will fail to
correspond to a valid set of bit commitments with probability at least (1 − 1
N
), since A1
cannot yet know the pairs (ni0, n
i
1) supplied by B2 for A2’s last commitment. So A1 must
supply the correct numbers. Now if A2’s last commitment was not of the random numbers
previously used by A1, a similar problem occurs. Hence, by induction on the total number
of commitments, the protocol is secure against Alice.
5. Security against quantum attacks
Quantum attacks give Bob no advantage against an honest Alice. His only extra
freedom is to send Alice superposition states instead of classical descriptions of the pairs
(ni0, n
i
1), and since she can legitimately carry out measurements on them and follow the
classical protocol, this gains him nothing. We can therefore assume that Bob sends classical
signals to Alice, and that at unveiling he carries out measurements on any superposed
quantum signals sent by her, so as to obtain a definite set of numbers for each commitment.
Alice’s position is a little more complicated to analyse. Quantum theory clearly
opens up new strategies for her. For example, following the general Mayers-Lo-Chau
strategy[6,8,10] for cheating standard quantum bit commitment schemes, she can keep all
her random choices at the quantum level. To do this, instead of sharing a list of random
numbers from 0 to N − 1 before the protocol, A1 and A2 share entangled “quantum dice”
in correlated states of the form
∑
N−1
i=0
ai|i〉〈i|.
Alice could also commit a random quantum bit — a state of the form a|0〉 + b|1〉 —
rather than a fixed classical bit, and keep the committed quantum bit in superposition
throughout, without detectably deviating from the protocol. This is no advantage if the
protocol is used for committing a prediction or some other stand-alone application. Al-
ice can always commit a randomly chosen classical bit in any bit commitment protocol,
classical or quantum. But it does allow Alice more general coherent quantum attacks to
be used on schemes of which the bit commitment is a sub-protocol — a property which
is shared by other classical bit commitment schemes[10] and which means that classical
cryptographic reductions involving such bit commitments cannot naively be carried over
into the quantum arena.
Modulo this freedom, the informal security arguments above carry over to the quantum
case. Alice has no cheating strategy by which she can initially commit the qubit a|0〉+b|1〉
and appear to follow through the protocol for a previously agreed number of steps, while
actually carrying out operations which give her probability greater than |a|2 +O(1/N) of
successfully unveiling a 0 or greater than |b|2+O(1/N) of successfully unveiling a 1 at the
end of the protocol.
6. Comments
The protocol gives a theoretical solution to the problem of finding bit commitment
schemes unconditionally secure over arbitrarily long time intervals. As its implementation
requires channel capacity that, for a fixed separation, increases exponentially with the
commitment time, it is not a practical solution to the problem of long term bit commitment.
For example, taking the security parameter m = 10 and the separation ∆x = 0.1 sec, and
assuming 100 gigabaud channels, the number of rounds of iterated commitments presently
practical is roughly 10.
For the moment, though, we see the protocol’s main interest as an existence theo-
rem. It demonstrates that taking special relativity into account changes the cryptographic
security attainable through information exchanges, and it shows that the interplay be-
tween special relativity, cryptographic security and channel capacity is a fertile area for
investigation.
The reason relativity helps is simple. In effect, it allows Alice and Bob to construct a
communication channel with a time delay which they can both trust, despite their mistrust
of the world outside their laboratories. Any trusted time delayed channel allows temporary
bit commitment, and the above protocol demonstrates that indefinite bit commitment can
then be achieved by recursively iterating bit commitments across the channel.
It is worth noting that trusted, although not perfectly secure, time delay could also
be enforced by physical means. Alice and Bob could, for example, watch carrier pigeons
going between their laboratories. It could also be enforced by a sequence of computational
bounds. Suppose, for example, that Alice and Bob can always be confident of keeping
abreast of technological developments, in the sense that at any given time they can find a
computational task which they are confident cannot be solved within 1 time unit. They
can then, for as long as their channel capacity permits, use the iteration strategy above
to achieve indefinitely secure bit commitment from a sequence of standard classical bit
commitment protocols which use their temporarily secure bounds and are secure against
the receiver. This may, in fact, be a more immediately practical application.
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